The arrest of two Israeli personnel on allegations of espionage has underscored Irans expanding efforts to penetrate Israels military by recruiting operatives from within.
Over the past year and a half, Israeli police, working alongside the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), have investigated more than 20 cases involving an estimated 40 to 50 suspects. Most remain in custody, though investigators believe additional suspects are still at large.
Capt. Sefi Berger of the Israel Polices Lahav International and Major Crimes Unit, which investigates Iranian espionage cases, told Fox News Digital that Tehran primarily seeks intelligence that could aid attack planning, along with information on high-profile individuals and other sensitive targets.
Payments vary widely. One network of seven suspects reportedly received about $300,000, while an reservist was allegedly paid $1,000 â and in some cases, even less.
“People may think they will get rich, but the money is not life-changing,” Berger said. “In one case last year involving two soldiers, one received just $21 and has been in prison for a year and a half.”
Iranian recruitment tactics include infiltrating WhatsApp and Facebook groups used by Israelis seeking freelance work, as well as pornography websites, where agents allegedly use compromising material to blackmail individuals into cooperating. Recruitment also relies on emotional manipulation of individuals whose moral judgment may be compromised.
“When recruiting a person, a relationship can develop between the handler and the spy. Sometimes the asset is looking for a father figure or a friend â someone who listens without judgment,” Berger said.
Former Shin Bet handler Gonen Ben Itzhak, who spent years recruiting sources within Palestinian society, told Fox News Digital that the issue is particularly serious, saying he has not previously seen so many attempts â and some successful cases â of spying against Israel.
“The million-dollar question is who makes a good recruit. We dont have a clear answer. There are certain indicators that someone may be more susceptible. The Iranians use social media â something we didnt have in the same way â and its a powerful tool to identify potential motives,” he said.
As a handler, Ben Itzhak said he sought to recruit as many viable candidates as possible while avoiding individuals likely to attract suspicion, such as known criminals. He described the process as gradual and often uncertain.
“At first, they need to agree to meet in secret. Sometimes they come but wont share information. I would start with simple questions â who leads in their village,” he said.
“Sometimes it takes time. Some refuse to cooperate, some may even act as double agents. In many cases, they are trained to collect information without being exposed. Its a process,” Ben Itzhak added.
In March, 22-year-old Haifa resident Ami Gaydarov was arrested on suspicion of manufacturing explosives intended to target a senior Israeli figure at the direction of an Iranian agent.
Last month, a man from the Israeli-Arab city of Qalansawe was detained on suspicion of allegedly spying for “a hostile actor, mediated through the Al Jazeera channel.” According to the investigation, Miqdad Moder Hosni Natur made contact with his handler after being introduced while searching for job opportunities through the Qatari-owned news organization.
Under Israeli law, contact with a foreign agent carries a sentence of up to 15 years in prison. Providing intelligence can result in more than 10 years imprisonment, while aiding the enemy during wartime carries a minimum sentence of life imprisonment and, in extreme cases, the death penalty.
Berger also warned against attempts by to deceive foreign agents, stressing that any contact is a serious offense.
“We had a hotel worker near the Dead Sea who falsely told Iranians that a group of Israelis would arrive.
