We write this recently returned from Doha, Qatar, where the background sounds of air raid sirens warning of incoming Iranian missiles have thankfully gone quiet. Civilians are no longer being told to take shelter, and Qatar Airways believes the air space is now safe enough to resume commercial flights.
As moved into its second month, critics reached consensus: Israel and the United States blundered themselves into a that has caused unnecessary deaths and spiraling oil prices, all against the prospect of yet another deadly American quagmire like Vietnam and Afghanistan. Despite the emerging media narrative back home, on the Gulf we can see that the U.S.-Israeli military strategy worked.
The critics are right that the nation was not adequately prepared for this. Unlike the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the objectives of Operation Epic Fury were never clearly communicated, either to the American people or our allies.
Nevertheless, Operation Epic Fury, although uneven and far from perfect, was a success.
From a military standpoint, Irans arsenal of ballistic missiles has been greatly depleted. More than 8,000 Iranian military targets have been decimated. Much of its nuclear infrastructure and air defenses, its navy and command architecture, all lay in ruins.
While the Iranian regime is fragile but intact, even the harshest critics of Operation Epic Fury must acknowledge that it has been significantly weakened, and that the near 50-year Iranian reign of terror has been greatly diminished.
We also saw the precision and skill of our as they snuck into Iran under cover of darkness to successfully rescue a weapons system officer who evaded capture for nearly 48 hours after his plane was shot down. With the pilot of that plane having been rescued quickly, the operation ensured that both crewmembers of that flight made it out of Iran safely.
Yet by the same token, the war was costly â and not just in terms of precious human lives and property. Americas advanced air and missile defense systems, essential to our seeing the full battlefield space and taking out enemy threats, have likewise been depleted or damaged. Given that this shield is literally the only thing between us and enemy missiles, US decision-makers should consider several lessons learned in the first month of this conflict.Â
First, the US and its allies are of interceptors at an unsustainable rate. Given that drones and missiles are clearly our adversaries weapons of choice, the US has exhausted hundreds of interceptors in the last year alone in Ukraine and the Middle East. Even if the US stepped up production, our military will still not have the luxury of an unlimited magazine, which means we are going to need to maximize our interceptor inventory in the short-term.Â
Second, fratricide continues to be a devastating reality. In early March, Central Command confirmed that three were inadvertently shot down. Kuwait forces mistook the US jets as incoming Iranian missiles during a barrage of fire, though fortunately all US servicemembers survived.
Third, this friendly-fire incident underscores that both the US and our allies still need a much more complete and instantaneous view of the battlespace. While the focus on foreign military sales has largely been focused on bombs and defensive interceptors, establishing a shared view of the battlefield must remain an investment priority.
These lessons point to the importance of and their growing role in modern combat. Simply put, more offensive fires, interceptors, and sensors are insufficient if there is not a way to integrate them across services and domains and with allies.
Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano, Army Program Executive Officer for Missiles and Space, has laid out the appropriate vision, saying “The ability to leverage multiple sensors on the battlefield, have that data fused and managed ⦠and then simultaneously being able to ensure that the
